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Abstract 
Software defined networking allows the separation of the control plane and data plane in 
networking. It provides scalability, programmability, and centralized control. It will use these 
traits to reach ubiquitous connectivity. Like all concepts software defined networking does not 
offer these advantages without a cost. By utilizing a centralized controller, a single point of 
failure is created. To address this issue, this paper proposes a distributed controller failover. This 
failover will provide a mechanism for recovery when controllers are not located in the same 
location. This failover mechanism is based on number of hops from orphan nodes to the 
controller in addition to the link connection. This mechanism was simulated in Long Term 
Evolution telecommunications architecture. 
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1 Introduction 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an enabling technology to overcome growing 
data traffic in dense heterogeneous networks. SDN provides an agile and flexible network. It 
decouples the control plane from the data plane to create a programmable and centralized 
software. It allows for scalability and management of a network. 
SDN can assume two different architectures. The first assumes a centralized controller 
over a network. Controllers can be responsible for nodes or other controllers. The second 
architecture assumes a distributed system of controllers. In either case SDN still maintains the 
same weakness, a single point of failure. At any time controller failure can transpire. Failure can 
occur from various events including power outages or lack of connectivity. Once failure 
transpires, nodes become orphans. They will be unable to transfer data to new connections 
without a controller. This paper will address the detection of failure and recovery in the 
distributed architecture. 
Failure analysis is an important concept in understanding how and why failure is 
occurring. Analysis helps to determine the methods for failover. By understanding failure, one 
can prevent of false positives and determine if failover is truly necessary. Failure analysis is 
broken into failure types and failure detection. 
In order to recover from controller failure, a mechanism must be created to enable orphan 
nodes to be connected to other controllers. Failover must react instantaneously to maintain 
network connectivity in a quick efficient manner. Recovery strategies have been researched and 
are broken into redundant controllers and non-redundant controllers. 
This paper proposes a Hop and Link Failover (HLF) mechanism for recovery due to a 
controller failure. This mechanism was simulated in a Long Term Evolution (LTE) environment 
to prove efficient failover. The LTE environment was chosen as it is predicted to use SDN in 5G 
technology. 5G LTE is the next generation of telecommunications that will enable more devices 
on the network. This is necessary because there is expected to be 50 billion Internet-of-Things 
devices by 2020 [1].  
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background 
concepts of the SDN paradigm, the SDN architecture in a distributed manner, analysis of failure 
types and detection of controllers, and various strategies for failover. Section 3 presents related 
works in failover and recovery. Section 4 introduces the HLF mechanism. Section 5 discusses 
the setup and performance of HLF simulation. Finally the paper is concluded in Section 6.  
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2 Background 
The following sections describe the concepts of SDN and how it incorporates into a 
distributed architecture. This description is followed by the analysis of failure types and 
detection of controllers. Lastly various strategies for failover are discussed. 
2.1 Software Defined Networking  
Software Defined Networking is a new technology for managing networks. Originally it 
was thought of as centralized control with an OpenFlow protocol for communications between 
the control plane and the data plane. Its definition has now changed and can be defined by three 
features. It is abstracted from the hardware thus having no dependency on physical hardware 
restrictions. It maintains centralized control to manage forwarding tables and policy 
delegation. It is programmable to dynamically configure networks based on policy and demand 
[2]. 
The SDN architecture consists of three planes and two interfaces for communication 
between the planes. The components include the application plane, the control plane, and the 
data plane. The two interfaces include the northbound and southbound interfaces [3]. The SDN 
architecture is shown in Figure 1.  
The data layer is the bottom most layer of the SDN architecture. It consists of network 
devices that forwards data based on control tables. Although the data layer contains control 
tables it does not create the table. The table comes from the controller. 
The southbound interface is used for communication between the data layer and the 
control layer. This interface is used to transmit the type and amount of traffic from the data layer 
to the control layer. It is also used to transmit the flow tables from the controller to the data layer. 
The controller layer is in charge of enforcing policies from the business applications. It 
creates forwarding tables and prioritizes quality of service based on business policies. The 
control layer sends forwarding tables to the data layer. 
The northbound interface is used for communication between the controller layer and the 
application layer. It provides abstract network views and enables network requirements. This 
interface can be implemented through an application protocol interface. 
The application layer is the top most layer of the SDN architecture. It consists of business 
applications. These applications programmatically communicate business policies to the 
network. They determine quality of service and network behavior through service level 
agreements.  
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Figure 1: Traditional Network vs. SDN [4] 
SDN can improve network communication. It brings new features to networking such as 
performance, virtualization, orchestration, programmability, visibility, and dynamic scaling. 
SDN improves performance by managing bandwidth and adjusting the traffic loads. It can be 
optimized for network capacity and adjust for node failure. It has the ability to orchestrate traffic 
for a plethora of devices with a few commands. SDN creates visibility in software to monitor 
resources. SDN is virtualized. It uses network resources regardless of physical location and can 
dynamically scale according to its need. 
2.2 Distributed SDN Architecture 
SDN can be incorporated in a distributed fashion. This architecture consists of multiple 
SDN controllers. Each SDN controller is responsible for one sub-network of nodes. These nodes 
are network devices such as switches or eNodeBs that deliver packets from devices to other 
devices. The controllers can communicate with one another in a distributed fashion. An example 
architecture is shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Distributed SDN Controllers 
The advantage of a distributed SDN architecture is that it enables reliability in the network by 
eliminating a single point of failure. It allows other controllers to adopt orphan nodes during 
controller failure. The distributed architecture allows each network to be dynamically 
configured. 
2.3 Long Term Evolution Architecture 
Long Term Evolution is a communications standard for telecommunications. It is located 
in the access portion of the Evolved Packet System to transmit data. LTE uses an architecture 
where the user equipment communicates with the Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
System Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) [5]. The E-UTRA then transmits data to the Evolved 
Packet Core (EPC) in order to communicate with the Internet. Figure 3 shows the architecture.  
 
Figure 3: Telecommunications Architecture [6] 
User equipment includes items such as computers, mobile phone, tablets, and Internet-of-
Things devices. It consists of devices that start the initial transmittal of data. User equipment 
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transmits data through radio waves to towers. These towers are known as eNodeBs. The 
ENodeBs communicate with one another as well as the EPC. 
The EPC is the core network for LTE communications. It is a framework that provides 
data on an IP network. The EPC consists of five major components: mobility management entity, 
serving gateway, packet data network gateway, the home subscriber server, and the policy 
control and charging rules function. These components hold user information, policy, and 
charging rules. It also allows user equipment to access the Internet. 
2.4 SDN in LTE 
SDN is intended to be included for 5G LTE. According to IMT-2020 [7], testing for SDN 
in 5G has begun during 2016. The telecommunications industry has already begun incorporating 
and testing 5G LTE [8].  
SDN can be integrated into the LTE architecture by replacing the serving gateway and 
packet data network gateway with a controller. An example is shown in figure 4. Through this 
architecture two types of data planes are created. The first data plane is incorporated in switches. 
These switches connect the EPC components. The second data plane is incorporated in the 
eNodeBs. The controller would handle the flow from user equipment to other user equipment or 
to the Internet. It would accomplish this feat by orchestrating the data between eNodeBs and 
switches.  
 
Figure 4: SDN in LTE Architecture 
2.5 Failure Types 
Controller failure can occur from software, network, or hardware failures [9]. During 
controller failure each node will maintain its current status but not be able to adjust flow control, 
management of services, or take on new connections until a new controller is adopted. 
Software failure can transpire through maintenance issues, bugs, or attacks. Maintenance 
issues typically occur while software is either being updated or restarted. Software will freeze 
and be unable to complete tasks. Software bugs can be introduced to a system while testing or 
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going live. Since controllers manage nodes, they are a target for hackers. Malicious software can 
be installed to take down or control the SDN controllers. 
Network failure transpires through lack of connectivity. This issue occurs when the 
controller and the node cannot communicate properly with one another. Connectivity can be a 
physical issue or software issue. 
Hardware failures happen from lack of maintenance or power. Hardware devices need to 
be monitored for dust and insects. Insects can cause shorting of integrated circuits. High levels of 
dust will insulate hardware components and can overheat components. Power failure happens 
when there are issues powering the hardware. 
2.6 Failure Detection 
Failure detection is important in determining controller failure. Often controllers do not 
fail. Instead they provide false positives that a failure has occurred. Often failure detection has a 
high mistake rate [10]. Detection of failure can be discovered in a plethora of ways including 
heartbeat messages and failure messages. 
Failure messages are a graceful way for controllers to fail. If a controller is shutdown due 
to maintenance, it can send failure messages to nearby neighbors informing them of its status. 
Heartbeat messages are a way for neighboring controllers to determine if a controller is 
alive. Each controller periodically sends messages to nearby neighbors announcing their 
existence. Reverse heartbeat messages are another way of failure detection. With reverse 
heartbeat messages, nodes message controllers periodically to determine if the controller is alive. 
In either case if messages are not received within a certain time frame controllers are assumed to 
have failed. 
With heartbeat messages the issue of false positives occurs. False positives emerge when 
heartbeat messages happen but are missed by neighboring controllers. Neighboring controllers 
then try to adopt nodes still associated with the connected controller.  
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3 Related Work 
Failover for distributed controllers is an important issue that must be addressed in order 
for SDN to provide ubiquitous connectivity. Distributed SDN controller failure can occur for a 
plethora of industries. These industries include: Wide Area Networks, telecommunications, data 
centers, and big data. Each area has its own constraints thus will require its own set of failover 
mechanisms. 
Failover for SDN has been researched topic. Mathis Obadia et al. [9] explored a greedy 
mechanism for failover. They implemented failover for distributed SDN controllers. Their 
simulation involved Mininet with Floodlight controllers. They developed a proactive approach to 
the greedy mechanism to enhance the speed of recovery. 
Li et al [11] proposed a proactive recovery mechanism based on controller load and 
switch-controller delay. In their mechanism they use scores to reassign switch paths during 
failover.  
A fast and load-aware controller failover mechanism was analyzed by Fang, Wang, and 
Wang [12]. They proposed an enhanced algorithm to Li et al [11] where controllers pre-compute 
a recovery plan for failure of other controllers. Their algorithm derives a recovery plan based on 
switch-controller delay from their mapping in addition to the standard deviation of the controller 
load. 
Failover with redundant controllers has been researched by Pashkov et al [13]. They 
developed a failover mechanism that incorporates various standby strategies for the redundant 
controllers. These methods include hot, warm, and cold standby. They proved their hot and warm 
mechanisms to be effective for failover with relatively low overhead. 
Borokhovich and S. Schmid [14] explored failover on OpenFlow switches. They 
analyzed local fast failover due to link failures. They presented a randomized deterministic 
algorithm for forwarding sets to show that local fast failover is efficient under randomized link 
failures. 
A method to solve control plane link failures for a single controller was proposed by 
Beheshti and Y. Zhang [15]. They proposed an algorithm to determine the optimal placement of 
the controller to maximize resiliency. This allows the network to react to switch and link failures 
in the data plane by re-routing control traffic.  
3.1 Redundant Controller Strategies  
Recovery mechanisms can be incorporated through redundant controllers. The redundant 
controller architecture incorporates two or more controllers per controller domain. The first 
controller will actively control the domain while the other controller(s) remain in a standby 
mode. In case of failure, the standby controller will replace the active controller. Standby 
controllers duplicate active controllers in all functionality. Redundant controller strategies 
provide a fast failover technique. Redundant controllers can be used when extra hardware and 
software is available and recovery time is crucial. Big data for real-time analytics is a prime 
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candidate for redundant controllers. Three strategies for controller redundancy include cold 
standby, warm standby, and hot standby [13].  
3.1.1 Cold Standby 
In the cold standby strategy, the standby controller is stateless. During failure of the 
active controller, the standby controller will become active and take over the failed controller’s 
domain without any knowledge of the network configuration. It will initialize its default 
configuration of services and applications before starting its topology discovery. In this strategy 
the standby controller remains unloaded until active. This strategy is ideal for stateless services 
and applications. 
3.1.2 Hot Standby 
In the hot standby strategy, the active controller is duplicated by the standby controller 
for all changes that occurs. This duplication runs a full state synchronization. When the active 
controller fails, the standby controller can replace its position in the current state. This minimizes 
the recovery time, yet it will require implementing software and hardware redundancy in 
addition to high communication overhead.  
3.1.3 Warm Standby 
In the warm standby strategy, the standby controller periodically runs a full state 
synchronization of the active controller to retain its state. During failure of the active controller, 
the standby controller will operate based on the last state synchronization. With this strategy 
some states will be lost and some services will be interrupted. This cost will reduce the overhead 
in communication. It will also eliminate full initialization. 
3.2 Non-Redundant Controller Strategies 
In most cases redundant controllers are unnecessary. They create overhead by requiring 
software and hardware redundancies as well as additional communication. In non-redundant 
controller strategies, there is only one controller per controller domain. During failure, 
controllers can increase their domain and adopt orphan nodes in their network. This reduces the 
overhead of the network. Non-redundant controller strategies can be effective in data centers or 
telecommunications. Two current strategies for non-redundant controllers include least loaded 
failover and greedy failover. A new failover proposed by this paper includes HLF. 
3.2.1 Greedy Failover 
In the greedy failover, controllers try to adopt orphan nodes at the edge of their domain. 
Greedy failover can be implemented reactively. First, detection of controller failure is conducted 
by the nodes. They transmit reverse heartbeat messages to their controllers to determine the 
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status of their controller. If the controller fails to respond to a number of messages, failure is 
detected and the nodes become orphan nodes. 
Orphan nodes must then search for a new controller. They send out discovery messages 
to their connected nodes. The nodes in close proximity forward the discovery message to their 
controllers. If the nodes in close proximity do not have a controller they will drop the message. 
The first controller to connect with the orphan node will adopt it. Flow tables contained in the 
orphan node will remain unchanged until the controller has ample time to discover the topology 
of its new domain. Once a controller adopts one orphan node it must update its database with 
information from the node. This must be completed before discovering more orphan nodes. The 
algorithm for the reactive greedy method is shown in Algorithm1. 
Algorithm1: Reactive Greedy 
1. listenForMessages 
2. if receiveMessage then 
3.   if hasController = false then 
4.     linkCapacity = getLink 
5.     hops = getHops 
6.     adoptController 
7.     hasController = true 
8.   end if 
9. end if 
 
Greedy failover can also be implemented in a proactive approach. In this approach, 
controllers take turns exchanging their network information with the nodes. This occurs when the 
nodes are powered up. The nodes use the greedy algorithm during their initialization setup to 
pre-determine which controllers to connect to in case of failure. The nodes then insert this 
information into their database. The algorithm for this has been developed by Mathis Obadia et 
al [9] and completed using the algorithm2. 
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Algorithm2: Proactive Greedy [9] 
1. while setOfNodes   0 do 
2.   for neighborDomain   setOfDomains do 
3.     if ∃ node   setOfNodes then 
4.       Add node to setOfNeighborDomainBackupNodes 
5.       Remove node from setOfNodes 
6.     end if 
7.   end for 
8.   if   neighborDomain   setOfDomains node   setOfNodes then 
9.      Add first node   setOfNodes to first setOfNeighborDomainBackupNodes 
10.      Remove node from setOfNodes 
11.   end if 
12. end while 
 
Detection of controller failure is established the same way as the reactive method above. 
Once failure is determined, orphan nodes contact controllers in their database. The controllers 
then establish connections to all orphan nodes simultaneously. Then the controllers updated its 
database with information from the newly adopted nodes simultaneously. 
3.2.2 Least Loaded Failover 
Least loaded failover [12] is a simple recovery mechanism that is efficient in data centers 
where controllers are often physically located next to each other. During controller failover, the 
least loaded controllers increase their controller domain by adopting the orphan nodes.  
Detection of controller failure is conducted by heartbeat messages. Controllers interact 
with each other to determine their nodes. Afterwards they monitor each other through heartbeat 
messages. When messages fail between controllers, failure is detected. The controllers then 
determine the least loaded controller. This controller will then adopt all the orphan nodes 
simultaneously. Flow tables contained in the newly adopted nodes will remain unchanged until 
the controller can discover the new topology. 
Least loaded failover can be combined with greedy failover. This mechanism has been 
proposed by Li et al. [11]. In this mechanism, scores are created based on controller loading and 
switch-controller delay. The scores determine how the nodes should be reassigned to controllers 
during failover. 
3.2.3 Proposed Hop and Link Failover 
HLF is a mechanism proposed by this paper. It takes a different approach to failover for 
distributed controllers. It incorporates the adoption of orphan nodes based on the physical 
number of hops from controllers as well as the link capacity from the controller to the nodes.  
The previous failover methods are intended for SDN in data centers. They assume 
controllers and nodes are in close proximity to one another. HLF is intended to provide efficient 
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and quick response for distributed controllers when controllers are not the physical located near 
each other. HLF would guarantee nodes to be within the least amount of hops to their controllers 
with the greatest amount of link capacity. HLF can be incorporated either reactively or 
proactively. This recovery mechanism can be implemented for a telecommunications network. 
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4 Proposed Hop and Link Failover Algorithm 
HLF is proposed to combat controller failure when controllers are not physically located 
to each other. The approach of HLF takes into account the heterogeneity of network connections. 
Controllers adopt orphan nodes based on the number of hops from the nodes to the controller as 
well as the link capacity between the nodes. HLF organizes controller domains initially based on 
the number of hops leading to the controller. If the number of hops is equivalent to another 
controller, the link connection between the controllers is compared. 
HLF is implemented using three algorithms. The first algorithm is for failure detection of 
the node, the second and third algorithms are for controller adoption. Failure detection is 
implemented through reverse heartbeat messages. Each node is responsible for sending messages 
to confirm the controller status. Failure is determined when messages are not received. Failure 
detection is implemented for each node in the following steps and algorithm3: 
Step 1. A node sends a heartbeat message to its controller every five seconds.  
Step 2. The node listens for a reply message from the controller. The timestamp from the last 
reply message is stored by the node. 
Step 3. If the node does not receive a reply message from their controller within thirty 
seconds it deems the controller failed [16].  
Step 4. The node becomes an orphan and broadcasts discovery messages to its neighbor 
nodes. 
Algorithm3: Failure Detection (Node) 
1. while hasController = true 
2.   listenForMessages 
3.   if currentTime – lastSentMessage >= 5 seconds then 
4.     sendHeartBeat 
5.   end if 
6.   if currentTime – lastReceivedMessage >= 30 seconds then 
7.     hasController = false 
8.   end if 
9. end while 
10. broadcastOrphan(neighborNodes) 
 
Controller adoption occurs when a controller receives a discovery message and tries to 
connect to the orphan node. The first controller to interact with the orphan node adopts the node. 
After the adoption, other controllers can also message the newly adopted node. The node will 
determine if it requires fewer hops than other controllers or is equal distance with more link 
capacity. If a controller exemplifies these metrics, it will replace the existing controller. Once a 
controller adopts a node it will then update its database with information from the node. 
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Controller adoption is implemented in the following steps and algorithms. Algorithm4 is from 
the controller’s perspective while algorithm5 is from the node’s perspective. 
Controller: 
Step 1. A controller receives a discovery message.  
Step 2. The controller creates an adoption message with the hops and link capacity to the 
orphan node. 
Step 3. The controller sends the message to the node. 
Algorithm4: Controller Adoption (Controller) 
1. listenForMessages 
2. if receiveMessage then 
3.   linkCapacity = getLink 
4.   hops = getHops 
5.   sendAdoptionMessage(linkCapacity, hops) 
6. end if 
 
Node: 
Step 1. The node receives an adoption message from controller1. 
Step 2. The node accepts the adoption. 
Step 3. The node receives an adoption message from controller2. 
Step 4. The node evaluates the connection to controller1 versus the connection to controller2. 
It takes the connection with the least amount of hops and bandwidth. 
Algorithm5: Controller Adoption (Node) 
1. listenForMessages 
2. if receiveMessage then 
3.   if hasController = false then 
4.     linkCapacity = getLink 
5.     hops = getHops 
6.     adoptController 
7.     hasController = true 
8.   else if hasController = true then 
9.     newLinkCapacity = getLink 
10.     newHops = getHops 
11.     if hops  newHops or (hops   newHops and linkCapacity < newLinkCapacity) then 
12.       dropCurrentController 
13.       linkCapacity = newLinkCapacity 
14.       hops = newHops 
15.       adoptController 
16.     end if 
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17.    end if 
18. end if 
 
An example of HLF is shown in a reactive approach through figures 5 through 8. Figure 
5 shows the architecture of three domains. Each domain consists of one controller and three 
nodes. The connection between each node varies. 
 
 
Figure 5: HLF Example Architecture 
Reverse heartbeat messages are sent from the nodes to the controller. If controller1 fails 
the nodes in its domain will announce their orphan status through discovery messages to 
neighboring nodes. Node3 will send messages to node2, node4, and node5 as shown in figure 6. 
Since node2 is the only node connected to a controller it will forward the message from node3 to 
its controller through node1.  
 
Figure 6: Node3 Orphan Broadcast 
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 Controller0 will reply to the orphan message to adopt node3. It will send an adoption 
message through node1 and node2. When the message reaches node3, node3 will accept the 
adoption from controller0 (Figure 7) with three hops and a link connection of 50 megabits per 
second (Mbps). Node3 will then send data to controller0 for it to update its database. 
 
Figure 7: Node3 Adoption 
 Node5 will concurrently go through the same process as node3 and be adopted by 
controller2. Controller2 will notify node5 that it is three hops away with a link connection of 70 
Mbps. Node4 broadcasts messages to node3 and node5. They forward their messages to their 
controllers. Node4 can be adopted by controller2 due to the latency of the messages. Controller2 
will inform node4 that is it is four hops away with a link connection of 30 Mbps. Node4 will then 
receive an adoption message from controller0 with four hops and link connection of 40 Mbps. 
Node4 will then upgrade to controller0. The final architecture for failover is shown in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Final Architecture 
HLF can be implemented proactively. In the proactive approach, each node pre-
determines their backup controller. This process is completed prior to controller failure. During 
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backup controller selection, the first controller to contact the node is initially the backup 
controller. Other controllers can replace the backup controller’s position if it requires less hops 
or equal with a higher link capacity.  
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5 Performance Evaluation 
HLF can be implemented in any distributed SDN architecture however it is most 
effective when controller locations are not be physically located nearby. To simulate this, HLF 
was integrated in a 5G LTE architecture. In this architecture a set number of eNodeBs were used 
to show temporary failover. The LTE architecture was simulated with the assumption that 
controllers will reside relatively near their controller domain but may not reside in the same data 
center as each other. 
5.1 Implementation and Setup 
To evaluate HLF, four failover mechanisms were simulated. The four simulations include 
HLF as a reactive mechanism, HLF as a proactive mechanism, greedy failover as a reactive 
mechanism, and greedy failover as a proactive mechanism. These simulations were developed 
for 5G telecommunications thus all controllers were positioned in different locations. The 
simulations consisted of two different architectures. 
The first failover architecture consists of three controllers and sixteen eNodeBs as shown 
in figure 9. In this simulation controller1 fails. Controller0 and controller2 must adopt orphan 
eNodeB5 through eNodeB10. 
 
Figure 9: Failover Architecture1 
The second failover architecture consists of three controllers and nine eNodeBs as shown 
in figure 10. In this simulation controller1 fails. Controller0 and controller2 must adopt orphan 
eNodeB3, eNodeB4, and eNodeB5.  
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Figure 10: Failover Architecture2 
Each simulation began with the initialization of the architecture. Next, controller1 would 
fail and failover procedures would begin. The orphan eNodeBs would broadcast orphan 
messages to nearby neighbors. To include latency of network delay with the messages, a variable 
sleep time was randomly created for both the controllers and eNodeBs. The network delay was 
determined after analysis of queuing delay, processing delay, propagation delay, and 
transmission delay. 
Queuing delay was determined for the maximum network traffic load of 25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 95%. These loads were evaluated with a maximum queue of 512 packets [20] per node or 
controller. With a message size of 750 bytes and rate of transmission of 175 Mbps, one packet 
was calculated to take 0.034 ms. At a maximum traffic load of 25%, the maximum queuing delay 
was 4 ms. At 50%, the delay was 9 ms. For 75% the delay was 13 ms and 95% load was 17 ms. 
Processing delay was assumed to be the same for every component thus neglected from 
the simulations. 
Propagation delay was calculated by the distance between two eNodeBs divided by the 
speed of light. The maximum distance for an eNodeB is 32 kilometers [17]. With this distance, 
the maximum propagation delay is 0.1 milliseconds (ms). Since this number is insignificant, 
propagation delay was assumed to be negligible. 
Transmission delay was calculated by the number of bits in a message divided by the rate 
of transmission. The message size was determined based on the size of a packet used in 
videotelephony [19]. This packet was 750 bytes. Rate of transmission was deducted based on the 
link capacity of a macrocell. A macrocell has a link capacity of approximately 175 megabits per 
second [18], however path loss will reduce the link connection. The minimum rate of 
transmission used was 50 megabits per second. Using these assumptions, the transmission delay 
calculates to 0.1 ms and is considered negligible. 
- 19 - 
 
For all failover mechanisms four simulation load variations were created. The simulations 
incorporated delay between 0 to 4 ms for 25% load, 0 to 9 ms for 50% load, 0 to 13 ms for 75% 
load, and 0 to 17 ms for 95% load. 
For all simulations, each controller was initialized to each eNodeB prior to starting the 
simulation. For the proactive mechanisms, the eNodeBs begin contacting controllers to 
determine their backup controller during initialization. 
5.2 Results and Analysis 
Each simulation varied due to the queuing delay time that was randomly generated for 
each eNodeB and controller. To combat any potential bias in these simulations, each failover 
mechanism ran twenty five simulations. For each failover mechanism there were five 
evaluations. These evaluations included eNodeB hops, link capacity, controller load, network 
recovery time, and controller traffic on the network. Each evaluation was completed for 25%, 
50%, 75%, and 95% uniform data traffic as well as non-uniform data traffic. 
5.2.1 First Failover Architecture 
The first architecture (figure 11a) was simulated in both the greedy and HLF 
mechanisms. This architecture reflects a general design for a telecommunications network. 
During these simulations the HLF mechanisms maintained the same architecture in every 
simulation regardless of the data traffic (figure 11b). The greedy mechanisms provided a 
variation of architectures. The least advantageous architecture was created by the greedy 
mechanisms. It occurred during the non-uniform data traffic. During this simulation the 
controller0 adopted all orphan eNodeBs (figure 11c).  
 
Figure 11a: Starting Architecture1 
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Figure 11b: HLF Resulting Architecture1 
 
Figure 11c: Greedy Resulting Architecture1 
 
5.2.1.1 eNodeB Hops 
In order to increase the speed of transmission, the reduction of hops to a destination is 
necessary. Reducing the amount of hops reduces the amount of queues the message must sit in as 
well as the reduction in the processing delay per eNodeB. This metric was evaluated by 
analyzing the resulting architecture for each simulation.  
Figure 12a shows the analysis of the simulation for architecture1. It shows the average 
number of hops from the eNodeBs to the controllers including the maximum and minimum 
number of hops in uniform data traffic. Figure 12b displays the average number of hops from the 
eNodeBs to the controllers including the maximum and minimum number of hops for 50% and 
95% uniform data traffic. The results show that HLF always maintained two hops from the 
controller to all the orphan eNodeBs. 
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The greedy failover exhibited a variety of architectures except for the reactive greedy 
mechanism with 25% uniform data traffic. The variation in the architecture was due to the 
incorporation of delay. Delay was a factor in the response time for both eNodeBs and controllers 
in the greedy mechanism. It allowed controllers to adopt eNodeBs that were closer to other 
controllers. The reactive greedy mechanism with 25% load is believed to have remained constant 
due to the low amount of delay. The results show the greedy failover mechanisms adopting 
orphan eNodeBs with an average between 2 and 2.12 hops.  
 
Figure 12a: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for all Uniform Data 
Traffic 
 
Figure 12b: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform 
Data Traffic 
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The first architecture was additionally simulated with non-uniform data traffic to increase 
the visibility of the issue of the greedy algorithm with regards to hops. The data traffic was non-
uniform thus that the controller domain under controller2 maintained a 95% load while the rest 
of the system maintained a 25% load. Figure 13 shows the results of an instance that had 
occurred. During this instance controller0 adopted all the orphan eNodeBs in the greedy 
mechanism. It increased the amount of hops to the controller for eNodeB7 to eNodeB10. In the 
HLF mechanism, 2 hops were maintained for all orphan eNodeBs. 
 
Figure 13: eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 in Non-Uniform Data Traffic 
Figure 11c shows the configuration that occurred when using the greedy mechanisms for 
the non-uniform data traffic. The figure shows a skewed architecture in which controller0 
adopted all orphan eNodeBs. ENodeB7 through eNodeB10 required less hops to controller2, 
however were not able to be adopted due to the latency of controller2. The latency of controller2 
could be temporary yet cause an inefficient ending architecture. 
The HLF mechanisms showed an evenly distributed ending architecture for failover 
(figure 11b). During failover it was possible for controller0 to initially adopt all orphan eNodeBs, 
however controller2 was able to re-adopt eNodeB7 through eNodeB10 to enable a more 
balanced architecture. This resulted with each orphan eNodeB having 2 hops to its new 
controller. 
With regards to the amount of hops between the orphan eNodeBs and the controllers, the 
greedy mechanisms make no guarantees. The possibility of an inefficient resulting architecture 
can occur. HLF displays a better ending architecture for failover. It enables eNodeBs to be 
adopted by the controller with the least amount of hops.  
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5.2.1.2 Link Capacity 
To avoid network latency, the connection from a controller to an eNodeB must be as 
efficient as possible. Therefore orphan eNodeBs should be adopted with the highest available 
link connection. Figure 14a shows the results of the average, maximum, and minimum link 
connection from the orphan eNodeBs to the controllers for all uniform data traffic. Figure 14b 
shows the results of the average, maximum, and minimum link connection from the orphan 
eNodeBs to the controllers for 50% and 95% uniform data traffic. The greedy mechanisms 
showed a variation in the link connection per eNodeBs with exception of the reactive greedy 
mechanism with 25% traffic load. The HLF mechanism maintained the maximum possible link 
connection during every simulation.  
 
Figure 14a: Average Link Connection for Architecture1 for all Uniform Data Traffic 
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Figure 14b: Average Link Connection for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform Data Traffic 
With non-uniform data traffic the results produced a lower link connection for the greedy 
algorithm while HLF maintained the maximum possible link connection with the least amount of 
hops (figure 11c, 15). The resulting architecture for the greedy mechanisms produced 100 Mbps 
link connection for all orphan eNodeBs. The resulting architecture for the HLF mechanisms 
produced 100 Mbps for eNodeB5 and eNodeB6 and 150 Mbps for eNodeB7 and eNodeB10. 
 
Figure 15: Link Connection for Architecture1 in Non-uniform Data traffic 
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The results for this architecture show that HLF always provides the ability for the highest 
link capacity from an eNodeB to its closest controller. The greedy algorithm does not ensure the 
maximum link connection for failover. 
5.2.1.3 Controller Load 
One measure of controller effectiveness can be correlated to the amount of load a 
controller has. The more eNodeBs communicating with a controller, the more traffic there is in 
that controller domain. A controller with higher traffic must have the capacity to handle it. 
Controller load for the architecture1 is shown on figure 16. These results display the average 
amount of eNodeBs per controller in addition to the maximum and minimum eNodeBs per 
controller with uniform data traffic. 
 
Figure 16: Average Controller Load for Architecture1 
On average all mechanisms performed in a similar manner, however the results show that 
the architecture for the greedy mechanisms varied in all cases except for the reactive greedy 
mechanism with 25% load. The HLF architecture did not vary. It maintained the same 
architecture every time. The results show controller0 adopted two eNodeBs in addition to its own 
eNodeBs and controller2 adopted four eNodeBs in addition to its own eNodeBs. While this 
architecture is not evenly distributed, it does not overload one controller. 
With uniform data traffic the greedy mechanisms showed variation in the amount of 
eNodeBs adopted per controller. Controller0 adopted between zero to four eNodeBs while 
controller2 adopted between two to six eNodeBs. This variation was dependent on the network 
delay. With less delay a controller was able to obtain more eNodeBs. This allowed controllers 
with less link connection to adopt eNodeBs. In a few simulations controller2 took the entire load 
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of the controller1 and adopted all the orphan eNodeBs. With non-uniform data traffic, the reverse 
occurred where controller0 adopted all orphan eNodeBs. This additional load is unnecessary for 
one controller to solely bear when another controller has the available capacity. 
With a non-uniform traffic load, controller0 adopted all the orphan eNodeBs in the 
greedy algorithm (figure #). This result was due to the latency of controller2. With HLF it 
maintained the same architecture as above. 
 
Figure #: Controller Load Non-Uniform Traffic 
For controller loading, the greedy mechanism showed a potential to create the most 
evenly distributed architecture, however not on a consistent basis. It also showed the potential to 
overload a controller. With HLF there was a consistent architecture. For this reason, HLF is a 
superior mechanism. 
5.2.1.4 Network Recovery Time 
The impact of failover can be evaluated through network recovery time. This metric is an 
evaluation of the recovery from the point at which a controller fails to the point at which all 
eNodeBs have been adopted in a final architecture. In this simulation, the recovery time was 
calculated from failure of the controller1 to the recovery of the last orphan eNodeB. 
Figure 17 displays the results of the average network recovery time in addition to the 
maximum and minimum recovery time with uniform data traffic. The reactive greedy time 
proved to be the fastest recovery time while the proactive HLF took the slowest time to recover. 
Reactive HLF is shown to have a slower recovery time than the reactive greedy mechanism. This 
is because HLF first runs the reactive greedy mechanism then accepts upgrades to other 
controllers that incorporate decreased hops or the same hops with increased link capacity. It 
should be noted that eNodeBs initially recover at the speed of the reactive greedy mechanism but 
total recovery time is increased due to the upgrades. For this architecture, the proactive 
mechanisms proved to be slower on average to its counterparts. The reason for this is due to the 
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structure of the architecture as well as how the proactive mechanism works. The benefit of the 
proactive mechanism is that orphan eNodeBs can be adopted when all the surrounding eNodeBs 
are in its controller domain. With this first architecture the orphan eNodeBs always have an 
immediate eNodeB in another domain. The proactive mechanism requires more overhead to 
operate. It must maintain both a controller and backup controller. This additional overhead 
creates additional processing time. 
 
Figure 17: Average Network Recovery Time for Architecture1 
For this architecture, the reactive greedy mechanism proves to provide the fastest 
failover. All other mechanisms have additional overhead which relays to added latency.  
5.2.2 Second Failover Architecture 
Architecture2 (figure 18a) was simulated in both the greedy and HLF mechanisms. This 
architecture reflects a specific design potentially for rural areas. In rural areas it is expected that 
mesh networks may not be cost effective as towns are established around nature’s topology. 
ENodeBs may be built following rivers or streams. During these simulations the HLF 
mechanisms maintained the same architecture in every simulation regardless of the data traffic 
(figure 18b). The greedy mechanisms resulted in a variation of architectures. The least 
advantageous architecture occurred when controller2 adopted all orphan eNodeBs (figure 18c).  
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Figure 18a: Starting Architecture2 
 
Figure 18b: HBF Resulting Architecture2 
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Figure 18c: Greedy Resulting Architecture2 
5.2.2.1 eNodeB Hops 
The results of the second architecture’s simulation for all uniform data traffic are shown 
in figure 19a. The results display an even amount of hops regardless of the algorithm. This is due 
to the architecture in which both controller0 and controller2 have an equal number of hops to 
each orphan node. Since the number of hops is equivalent, HLF does not provide any advantage 
to the greedy algorithm for this metric. Figure 19b displays the average hops for 50% and 95% 
data traffic per eNodeB. 
 
Figure 19a: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture2 for all Uniform Data 
Traffic 
 
Figure 19b: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform 
Data Traffic 
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This architecture was also simulated with non-uniform data traffic. In this simulation 
controller0’s domain operated with a 95% data traffic while the rest of the network operated at 
25% data traffic. In this simulation there was no difference in regards to the number of hops 
(figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture2 in Non-Uniform Data Traffic 
5.2.2.2 Link Capacity 
The results of the average link connection for all uniform data traffic are shown in figure 
21a. Figure 21b shows the average link connection for 50% and 95% uniform data traffic. The 
greedy mechanisms displayed inconsistent failover architectures. In some simulations controller0 
adopted all orphan eNodeBs while in other simulations controller2 adopted all of them. The 
results show the average link connection was less than the maximum available link connection. 
The HLF mechanisms did not show a variation. HLF ensured that in the final failover 
architecture controller0 adopted the orphan eNodeBs 100% of the time. The results prove to 
enable the maximum link capacity for all orphan eNodeBs. 
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Figure 21a: Average Link Connection for Architecture2 for all Uniform Data Traffic 
 
Figure 21b: Average Link Connection for Architecture2 for 50% and 95% Uniform Data Traffic 
This architecture was also simulated with non-uniform data traffic as described in the 
eNodeB Hops section. Figure 22 shows the results of this simulation. The greedy mechanisms 
adopted the lowest available link connection while HLF adopted the highest available link 
connection. For the greedy mechanisms all orphan eNodeBs adopted a link connection of 75 
Mbps. In HLF eNodeB3 was adopted with a link connection of 80 Mbps while eNodeB4 and 
eNodeB5 adopted a link connection of 100 Mbps. 
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Figure 22: Link Connection for Architecture2 in a Non-Uniform Data traffic 
The results for this architecture show that HLF provides the highest link capacity from all 
the connections to the controllers. The greedy mechanism cannot be trusted to provide the 
maximum link capacity during failover. 
5.2.2.3 Controller Load 
Controller load varied with the greedy mechanisms for all instances of uniform data 
traffic (figure 23). The HLF mechanisms did not vary the controller load. It maintained the same 
architecture every time. With HLF the results showed controller0 adopted 3 eNodeBs in addition 
to its own eNodeBs and controller2 did not adopt any eNodeBs. 
With the greedy mechanisms, the amount of eNodeBs adopted per controller varied from 
0 to 3 for controller0 and from 0 to 3 for controller2. This variation was dependent on the 
network delay. 
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Figure 23: Average Controller Load for Architecture2 
For non-uniform loads, the HLF mechanism resulted with controller0 adopting 3 
eNodeBs in addition to its own eNodeBs and controller2 did not adopting any. With the greedy 
mechanism, the opposite occurred where controller2 adopted 3 eNodeBs and controller0 did not 
adopt any. 
 
 
In this architecture controller loading is maintained regardless of the mechanism. One 
controller will always adopt all orphan eNodeBs. This is due to the how both mechanisms 
operate. 
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5.2.2.4 Network Recovery Time 
Network recovery time for uniform data traffic is shown in figure 24. The proactive 
greedy mechanism shows the fastest average network recovery times. The slowest average 
recovery time is from the HLF reactive mechanism. The proactive mechanisms prove to be faster 
due to its nature. In the proactive mechanisms, the eNodeBs have a known backup location to 
another controller. They message the controller for adoption immediately after failure. This 
behavior allows a fairly linear recovery time regardless of the number of orphan eNodeBs [9]. 
With the reactive greedy mechanism, the recovery time correlates to number of orphan 
eNodeBs. This behavior is to be expected as the eNodeBs in the reactive mechanism can only 
message controllers once their neighbor has is in a different domain. The reactive HLF 
mechanism takes the longest average recovery time for the final failover architecture. As 
explained for the first architecture this is due to the fact that it runs the greedy mechanism then 
potentially upgrades. 
 
Figure 24: Average Network Recovery Time for Architecture2 
For this architecture the proactive mechanisms are the faster mechanisms for failover.  
The speed at which failover can occur in a proactive mechanism is not dependent on the amount 
of eNodeBs but the number of hops from an orphan eNodeB to another domain. The greater the 
number of hops are the faster the proactive mechanisms will recovery when compared to the 
reactive mechanisms. 
5.2.3 Control Traffic 
Control traffic is a part of network traffic and is defined as the amount of control data 
transferred between the eNodeBs and the controllers. For theses simulations the control traffic 
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did not vary by the greedy mechanism or HLF mechanism. Control traffic was affected varying 
on whether the mechanism was reactive or proactive.  
Failover mechanisms require heartbeat messages. These messages increase the control 
traffic on each component in the network. Increased messages correlate to an increase in network 
delay. In the simulations the reactive mechanisms increased the data traffic by sending reverse 
heartbeat messages from the eNodeBs to its prospective controller. The proactive mechanisms 
required additional messaging by sending reverse heartbeat messages to both its controller and 
backup controller. This doubled the amount of required messaging and increased the network 
delay. 
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
As SDN is being commercialized for networking, it becomes apparent that failover 
strategies are needed to remove the issue of a single point of failure and maintain seamless 
connectivity for users. There are a plethora of failover strategies available. Each mechanism has 
its own advantages that should be analyzed prior to implementation. 
This paper has shown the capabilities of the HLF mechanism to handle failover when 
controllers are setup in a distributed architecture and controller locations not located in the same 
location. HLF is a non-redundant controller strategy that can be incorporated in a reactive or 
proactive mechanism. It proves to be an advantageous mechanism that provides failover for 
nodes with the least amount of hops and the highest link capacity. It addresses the randomness of 
the greedy algorithm for node adoption. 
Future work will include a weighted algorithm for dynamic adjustment for heterogeneous 
networks. This mechanism will consider network resources such as controller load, capacity, and 
bandwidth. This direction will be investigated to further tune failover procedures for distributed 
controllers.  
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